Perspectives on epistemology of economics
Andres Lazzarini2012
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Abstract
Hands, Douglas Wade: Orthodox and heterodox economics in recent economic methodology. Mireles Flores, Luis: Causality, pluralism, and economic policy making. Scarano, Eduardo R.: Economics as a separate science: A critical review. IVAROLA, LEONARDO y MARQUES, GUSTAVO: Expectations-based mechanisms - An interventionist account. Crespo, Ricardo F.: A teleological causal mechanism for economics: Socio-economic machines. Gomez, Ricardo J.: On economics and the impossibility of its reduction to physics. Weisman, Diego y Thefs, German: The ways of scientific representation: Models, maps and reality. The ways of scientific representation: Models, maps and reality. Borella, Agustina: A critical look at critical realism. Lazzarini, Andres: Mill, Hausman and the traditional method in neoclassical economics.
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