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2012
Middle East Research and Information Project, 2019
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011
International Journal, 1986
Oil, influence, and development: the Gulf states and the international economy Cycles of prosperity and depression are not new to the Gulf. Gulf traders in their dhows long ago travelled far afield, down the east coast of Africa, to the Indian subcontinent, to the East Indies, and to China. Gulf dhows have been credited with hauling the major share of trade between India, Africa, and the Gulf over several centuries. Pearling and fishing thrived in the narrow straits of the Gulf, adding to the gains from shipping and the caravan business. All this activity fuelled a prosperity that lasted until the nineteenth century when the region began to have substantial contacts with Western colonialism. These contacts led to the destruction of traditional activities and a diminished importance for the traditional shipping routes, and by the time the world depression of the 193os arrived, the Gulf was at the nadir of its economic fortunes. Then, with the discovery of oil and its subsequent exploitation, the situation changed dramatically. Oil was found as early as 1932 in Bahrain, but the major shift in the fortunes of the region came with the Iranian oil crisis of 1951.' Even so, the oil revenues of most of the governments of the region were not sufficient to finance large-scale developmental efforts prior to 1973. It was not until
The Emergence of the Gulf States: Studies in Modern History (edited by J.E. Peterson), 2016
This is a comprehensive survey of the traditional economy of the GCC states before oil and the early impact of oil.
Middle Eastern Studies, 1990
Journal of Arabian Studies, 2018
Oil has seriously impacted the institutional development of the state in the Arabian Peninsula. More specifically, the sudden and unprecedented acquisition of massive oil revenues resulted in the freezing of the state’s formal and informal institutions, at the point at which petrodollars were injected into the state’s coffers. From then on, state leaders were able to deploy the state’s wealth to dictate the pace and direction of institutional change. Over time, any institutional change has been directed towards enhancing regime security, and the pace of change has been calculated and deliberately slow. Any political opening has been dictated by the logic of state power maximization (in relation to society). At the same time, partly to ensure its popular legitimacy and partly through the vision of its leaders, the state has deployed its massive wealth both to foster rapid economic and infrastructural development, and to enhance the living standards of its citizens. In other words, whereas oil may have stunted institutional development –– i.e., an institution’s curse –– it has been an economic blessing.
Gleaming glass skyscrapers, state-of-the-art technology, and wealthy merchant families have replaced the Gulf’s muddy towns and villages populated by traders and pearl fishers that once lacked electricity, running water or modern communications. The region’s modern day projection of a visionary cutting- edge, 21st century urban environment masks however the fact that some things have not changed. Gulf states continue to be ruled by the same families, generation after generation. The families have become what an Emirati regime critic, Yousif Khalifa al-Yousif, termed “an institution of entitlement.”1 Alongside autocrats, the region also remains home to holy warriors and modern-day pirates. The principle of governance that what is good for business is good for the village-turned-nation still guides rulers who rank among the region’s foremost businessmen. If, however, the region’s physical transformation speaks to an almost unitary vision of modernity, its politics tell a very different story, one of deep-seated social conservatism despite concessions in some states to cultural attributes of expatriate communities, resistance to political change, and a clinging to the status quo at whatever price.
Applying SSA Analysis to the Arab World The theory of social structures of accumulation (SSA) was developed to explain long swings of alternating expansion and stagnation in Western capitalist economies. The post-World War II SSA led by the United States entailed the projection of U.S. military power overseas, the allocation of U.S. foreign aid to allies and protégés, and the investment of U.S. surplus capital abroad. United States hegemony provided assurance of energy and raw material supplies and new arenas for the global spread of capitalist production, as well as the growth of markets for U.S. and, increasingly, Western European and Japanese exports. Because many areas of the Arab region were rich in easily extractable sources of energy and conveniently located near Europe, controlling the region became an integral part of the United States’ economic and political strategy as it replaced shrinking British and French imperial power. The importance of SSA analysis is double barreled for understanding economies of the Arab World. First, the establishment and evolution of this "post World War II SSA" led by the United States, and its evolving contradictions, constituted the international context within which the Arab territories attained political independence as new “nations” and undertook “modern” economic development. Second, the SSA conceptual apparatus can be used to examine the economic achievements and internal contradictions of the Arab countries and the institutions facilitating or impeding accumulation in each period of their post-war history. The cases of Egypt, Jordan, and Kuwait illustrate the spectrum of variation within the regional SSA in both internal economic features and external relations. Egypt represents the subgroup of more populated countries that have bigger agricultural sectors, a greater degree of industrialization, larger domestic markets and more internal economic articulation than the other groups. Jordan represents a second subgroup with smaller populations, small agricultural sectors, small but significant industrialization, and greater dependence on the export of labor to generate national income. Kuwait represents a third subgroup, “rentier” economies defined by the export of oil and natural gas and very small agricultural and manufacturing sectors, which, with small populations of citizens and relatively high per capita incomes, are dependent on the import of goods, labor and other services to be economically viable.
Summary Report 3, 2011
The Political Economy of the Gulf Summary Report details research conducted at the CIRS "Political Economy of the Gulf" working group meetings held in Doha over the course of two years. The project was launched in 2009. As with other CIRS research initiatives, after a thorough review of existing literature on the topic, certain gaps were identified meriting further original research and scholarship. Select scholars were invited to participate in a working group for focused discussions on a range of sub-topics. During these meetings the participants contributed their expertise, and began working on papers in their specialty areas. The ultimate product of this research project is an edited book on The Political Economy of the Persian Gulf (Columbia University Press/Hurst, 2011). The working group meetings held in Doha, Qatar, meant that authors were able to work closely together in order for the individual chapters to cross-reference each other for better coherence and intellectual synergy of the volume. Each study is an in-depth work of scholarship that is original, analytical, and makes a significant contribution to the field.
Global Change, Peace & Security, 2017
In the past half-decade, the role of the Gulf in the international political economy has changed dramatically. The region's position as a supplier of world hydrocarbons has slipped, even as local consumption of oil and gas continues to expand. Gulf investments have shifted from the industrialized countries to the Middle East and North Africa. Saudi Arabia no longer exercises disproportionate influence in the Group of 20. Finally, relations with the People's Republic of China and India have become truly interdependent, which gives the Gulf the capacity to exercise leverage over these two rising powers, despite its diminished position in global affairs.
This work seeks to test the viability of Rentier State Theory for explaining economic and political developments in the Arab Gulf. In particular, this theoretical paradigm is used to analyze the aforementioned developments in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC States): Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, The United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Oman. This research contends that the economic and political trajectories of the GCC states are directly linked to the accrual and dissemination of natural resource rents.
Occasional Paper 18, 2017
This essay takes as its focus society in the Persian Gulf over the long term, both before and after oil. In order to understand the transitions society has gone through, it is necessary to review the region’s historical evolution and how society in the Gulf today differs from that of the pre-oil era. The Gulf is presented as a distinct historical region, where a tradition of free movement helped account for the success of its port cities, themselves linked more to the Indian Ocean basin than the Middle East. In the twentieth century, the historic ties that connected the people of the Gulf littoral were curtailed as nationalism became the dominant ideology, and borders and passports were imposed. After oil was discovered and exports began following World War II, the small Gulf shaikhdoms, most of which were under British protection until 1971, experienced a surge in revenues that ushered in the modern era. Newly independent states sought to impose a new identity, manipulate history, and exploit sectarian cleavages to solidify the power of ruling dynasties. The historic cosmopolitanism of the Gulf was ignored by states that privileged the tribal, Bedouin heritage of their leaders. Arabs and Persians, both Sunni and Shi‘a, as well as many other groups have lived with each other in the region for many centuries, during which mutual differences occasionally led to conflict. But the current mistrust, tension, and sense of vulnerability felt by all sides is a product of the modern age.
International Affairs, 2007
Digest of Middle East Studies, 2000
his book attempts to identify and examine the impact of oil on socioeconomic and political changes a s well as development T in the (GCC) Gulf Cooperation Council countries with the aim of reflecting on the future challenges facing those countries.
Mediterranean Politics, 2015
Established in 2005, the Center for International and Regional Studies at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar is a premier research institute devoted to the academic study of regional and international issues through dialogue and exchange of ideas, research and scholarship, and engagement with national and international scholars, opinion makers, practitioners, and activists.
While the Indian Ocean has served as a model of historical and archaeological connectivity for decades, in-depth studies of regional development across the ocean often do not incorporate trans-regional evidence and are informed by divergent theoretical perspectives. For the Persian/Arabian Gulf, this has resulted in a profusion of studies on economic and political development that do not focus on concurrent cultural and social change, ignoring how large-scale economic trends influence life ‘on the ground’. Limited trans-regional engagement also constrains the economic and political narratives, which sometimes contradict evidence known from other parts of the Indian Ocean. This dissertation tackles the narrative of economic growth and subsequent decline in the 9th-14th century Gulf and re-examines it first through analysing settlement distribution in the western Indian Ocean, and then through a comparison of material culture from two sites in the Gulf – Kūsh and Bilad al-Qadīm. In doing so, it aims to problematise our understanding of the medieval history of the Gulf and the western Indian Ocean, as well as to nuance the widely-assumed link between economic and social or cultural change.
The Beirut Forum , 2021
The Persian Gulf is a relatively shallow body of water measuring 250,000 square kilometers, with elevated levels of salinity and high water temperatures. While these material features are uncontested, the Gulf's many political attributes are not. Whether it is the battle over its nomenclature-Persian or Arab Gulf-or the nineteenth century contention that it was a "British lake", or U.S. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger's quip in 1981 that it is "the umbilical cord of the industrial free world", for over a century policymakers and scholars have leveraged the Gulf to promote various local and global agendas. These projects range from justifying the British colonial presence in the Gulf until 1971, massive public and private investments by the United States since World War II, struggles for decolonization by various political movements, family strategies for upward mobility via migration, and regional rivalries between Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. What makes the Persian Gulf such a fraught space for so many decades and an object of imperial ambitions, national antagonism, and migratory hopes? By fraught I do not mean struggles over who is its rightful proprietor or disputes over a stable or true meaning of the Gulf. Instead, I contend that roots of these struggles are in the multiple and competing ways that the Gulf has been regionalized through concrete social formations and abstract representations. The larger book project which is the basis for this presentation shows how standard narratives of the region contain a common contradiction, treating the Gulf as a boundary between empires, states, Muslim sects, and alliance blocs, yet insisting that it is a regional whole and abstract object that can and should be secured or contained. It is in this manner that the Persian Gulf region has "come to take on a real existence in our consciousness", to use Adam Hanieh's phrase from the workshop's position paper; but the Gulf has also continuously been treated as vulnerable, with its borders constructed, eroded, and overlain by new forms of transnationalism-oceanic, imperial, international, and global.
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